Abstract. Concurrent non-malleable zero-knowledge (CNMZK) considers the concurrent execution of zero-knowledge protocols in a setting where the attacker can simultaneously corrupt multiple provers and verifiers. We provide the first construction of a CNMZK protocol that, without any trusted set-up, remains secure even if the attacker may adaptively select the statements to receive proofs of. Previous works [BPS06,LPTV10] only handle scenarios where the statements are fixed at the beginning of the execution, or chosen adaptively from a restricted set of statements.
Introduction
Zero-knowledge (ZK) interactive proofs [GMR89] are fundamental constructs that allow the Prover to convince the Verifier of the validity of a mathematical statement x ∈ L, while providing zero additional knowledge to the Verifier. Concurrent ZK, first introduced and achieved by Dwork, Naor and Sahai [DNS04] , considers the execution of zero-knowledge protocols in an asynchronous and concurrent setting. In this model, an adversary acts as verifiers in many concurrent executions of the zero-knowledge protocol, and launches a coordinated attack on multiple independent provers to gain knowledge. Non-malleable ZK, first introduced and achieved by Dolev, Dwork and Naor [DDN00] , also considers the concurrent execution of zero-knowledge protocols, but in a different manner. In this model, an adversary concurrently participates in only two executions, but plays different roles in the two executions; in the first execution (called the left execution), it acts as a verifier, whereas in the second execution (called the right execution) it acts as a prover. The notion of Concurrent Non-malleable ZK (CNMZK) considers both of the above attacks; the adversary may participate in an unbounded number of concurrent executions, playing the role of a prover in some, and the role of a verifier in others. Despite the generality of such an attacks scenario, this notion of security seems most appropriate for modeling the execution of cryptographic protocols in open networks, such as the Internet. Barak, Prabhakaran and Sahai (BPS) [BPS06] provided the the first CNMZK argument for N P in the plain model (i.e., without any set-up assumptions); see also the more efficient instantiation of Ostrovsky, Pandey and Visconti [OPV10] . More recently, Lin, Pass, Tseng and Venkitasubramaniam (LPTV) [LPTV10] provided a somewhat different approach to constructing CNMZK protocols, improving the round-complexity of the BPS construction, as well as providing a construction of a CNMZK proof.
Adaptive inputs selection. All the above-mentioned feasibility results for CNMZK, however, consider a quite restricted form of input selection: More precisely, whereas the attacker is allowed to adaptively select the statements it gives proofs of (on the right), the statements to receive proofs of (on the left) are assumed to be fixed before the execution begins.
Indeed, there is a sense in which this is necessary: as argued by Lindell [Lin03] , if we consider a scenario where the left statement are chosen adaptively by an "environement" (think of this as some other arbitrary protocol running in the network), then the notion of CNMZK collapses down to the notion of Universally Composable ZK [Can01] , which is known to be unachievable without set-up [CKL03] .
We here focus on the simpler case of just "self-composition": that is, we only consider the security of the ZK protocols (and thus we do not allow them to interact with other protocols in the network; this is similar to the original setting studied in the context of Concurrent ZK). Yet, we want to capture a notion of security where also the statements in the left executions are adaptively chosen. The natural way to do this is to (just as in the definition of security of signature schemes [GMR89] ) allow the attacker to adaptively select the statements it wants to hear proofs of on the left (as well as the statements it gives proofs of on the right); additionally we must restrict the attacker to only ask to hear proofs of statements that are true (or else we can never expect the conversation with the provers to be ZK-if the statement is false, then the prover on the left will not be able to provide a proof, which thus reveals information). However, one problem arises when statements in the left interactions are chosen adaptively: to provide a ZK proof of a statement, the prover (on the left) needs to receive a valid witness; however, it might be hard to compute valid witnesses for general languages in N P. We can consider the following three possibilities:
-There is a non-uniform PPT machine, called the witness-selecting machine, such that, whenever the adversary chooses a statement to hear a proof of, the witness-selecting machine on input the statement, generates a witness for the prover. We call this weak adaptive input selection. Since the witness-selecting machine is computationally bounded, the adversary is implicitly restricted to only choose statements for which a valid witness can be computed efficiently. In essence, this case is similar to the static input selection case; instead of having all the witnesses fixed at the beginning of the execution, there is a fixed "master witness" (i.e., the non-uniform advise), from which all the witnesses can be generated efficiently. Not surprisingly, previous works on CNMZK with static input selection [BPS06, LPTV10] can already be extended to handle weak adaptive input selection.
-We can slightly strengthen the power of the witness-selecting machine by allowing it to also receive as input the view of the honest left prover (as well as the views of the adversary and right receiver). This further enables, for instance, scenarios where the adversary can request for a proof about the execution of other proof-instances in the execution (e.g., prove that the prover has behaved honestly in previous proofs). -Finally, we may even model the witness-selecting machines to be computationally unbounded (in addition to receiving the views of all parties as input), which allows the adversary to adaptively choose any true statements to hear proofs of.
In this work, we consider adaptive input selection with the most powerful witnessselecting machine. We call a ZK protocol that is secure in this setting a CNMZK with Adaptive Input Selection, or for short Adaptive CNMZK (ACNMZK). More precisely, a ZK protocol is ACNMZK if for every adversary A, there exists a computationally efficient simulator-extractor that can simulate both the left and the right interactions for A, while outputting a witness for every statement proved by the adversary in the right interactions. Our main result is the construction of an ACNMZK proof:
Theorem 1 Assume the existence of collision-resistant hash functions. Then there exists a ω(log 2 n)-round concurrent non-malleable zero-knowledge proof with adaptive input selection (and with a black-box simulator) for all of N P.
Related Work. We mention that there are several works constructing CNMZK protocols in various trusted set-up models. For instance, [SCO + 01,CF01,DN02]) provide constructions of Universall Composable ZK in the Common Reference String (CRS) model; these protocol are thus also ACNMZK.
An interesting recent work by Yao, Yao and Zhao [YYZ09] provide a construction of a CNMZK protocol in the Bare Public Key Model; their protocol is not UC secure but satisfies a notion CNMZK with adaptive inputs selection (for both the left and the right interaction); our definition of ACNMZK in the plain model is heavily inspired by their work.
Techniques. Our protocol is a close variant of the LPTV protocol; let us start by reviewing it. The protocol uses two main components. The first component is the notion of concurrently extractable commitments (CECom) introduced by Micciancio, Ong, Sahai, and Vadhan [MOSV06] . Informally, values committed to using a CECom can be extracted by a rewinding simulator even in the concurrent setting. In our protocol (as in most concurrent ZK protocols), the verifier commits to a random trapdoor using CECom, so that our ZK simulator may extract this trapdoor to perform simulation. The second component is the notion of robust non-malleable commitments (an extension due to Lin and Pass [LP09] of the notion of non-malleable commitments as defined by Dolev, Dwork, and Naor [DDN00]); roughly speaking these are non-malleable commitment schemes with an additional robustness property that makes them convienent to compose with other protocols.
The high-level idea behind the LPTV protocol (just as in the protocol of [BPS06] ) is to start off with a preamble phase where the verifier uses a CECom to commit to a trapdoor; next in a commit phase, the prover commits to a witness of the proof statement using both a CECom and robust non-malleable commitments; and finally during a proof phase, the prover proves using a (standalone) ZK protocol that it has either committed to a valid witness, or a valid trapdoor in the commit phase. To prove security, LPTV provides a simulator that uses rewindings to extract out trapdoors (from the CECom in the preamble phase) to simulate the commit and proof phases of the left interactions, and uses rewindings again to extract the witnesses committed to by the adversary (from the CECom in the commit phase) on the right. The crux of the proof is then to show that even during the simulation, when the simulator commits to trapdoors (instead of real witnesses) in left interactions, the adversary still cannot commit to a trapdoor in right interactions, so that the values extracted out from the right interactions must be real witnesses. Very roughly speaking, this follows from the security guarantees of robust non-malleable commitments.
When considering adaptive input selection (for the left executions) a problem arises. First, proving indistinguishability of the simulation becomes problematic: in fact, getting a concurrent ZK protocol with adaptive input selection is already non-trivial (we call it Adaptive Concurrent Zero-Knowledge (ACZK)); our core technical contribution is to provide a solution to this problem. The reason for this is that proving indistinguishability of the simulation requires performing a hybrid argument, where we switch the witness used in the left interactions from the trapdoors (used by the simulator) to the real witness (used by the prover). More precisely, we consider a hybrid H i , where the first i left interactions are simulated using the trapdoors, and the later ones use the real witnesses. The problem is that the real witnesses might not be efficiently recoverable since the statements are chosen adaptively by the adversary (it is computed by a computationally unbounded witness-selecting machine); so the hybrid is not efficiently computable! Our idea for circumventing this problem can be described as follows:
-First, we switch the order of the hybrids. We consider hybrids H i where the first i left interactions are emulated using real witness and the later ones are simulated using trapdoors. The reason for doing this is that we can now non-uniformly fix the real witnesses of the first i left interactions by hardcoding the "prefix" of hybrid H i before the i th left interaction; and then the remaining execution can be efficiently emulated using the real witnesses.
-But now the obstacle is that arguing indistinguishability of H i and H i+1 becomes problematic. To show indistinguishability we need to show that simulating the i th left interaction using a real witness or trapdoor is indistinguishable (other interactions are simulated identically in the two hybrids). It seems that this should just follow from the hiding and ZK property of the commit and proof phases of the left interaction. However, the problem is that (when trying to extract the trapdoors of the latter left interactions), we might be rewindings the i th left interaction. Our way around this problem is to add more CECom to the preamble phase; the idea is to show that there exists some alternative simulator, that generates a statistically close distribution, but is able to avoid rewinding the messages in the commit and proof phases of the left interaction that we want to violate indistinguishability of.
To also complete the proof of non-malleability, a second (very related problem) arises: namely, we need to argue that the witness committed to by the adversary on the right are valid even in simulation; this is usually done through a hybrid argument as well and relies on the robust non-malleability of the commitment scheme used in the commit phase (instead of the hiding and ZK properties). When doing this, we again run into the same problem as when showing indistinguishability of the simulation. Here the issue is that we need to ensure that the robust non-malleability property holds even under rewindings. We use the same idea to overcome this problem: as long as there are sufficiently many CECom in the preamble phase, we can describe an alternative simulator that produces a statistically close distribution without rewinding these commitments that we want to violate robust non-malleability of.
Overview. Section 2 contains the basic notations and definitions of ACNMZK and other primitives. In Section 3, we present our main result, a ω(log 2 n)-round ACNMZK proof system for all of N P, from collision resistant hash functions. In Section 4.2, we first focus on showing the ACZK property of the protocol, which contains the main technical content of this paper; then in Section 5 we sketch how to extend this proof to also show the ACNMZK property.
Preliminaries
Let N denote the set of all positive integers. For any integer n ∈ N , let [n] denote the set {1, 2, . . . , n}, and let {0, 1}
n denote the set of n-bit strings, and ε the empty string. We assume familiarity with interactive Turing machines, interactive protocols, statistical/computational indistinguishability, notions of interactive proofs, zero-knowledge, (strong) witness-indistinguishability, and notions of statistically binding/hiding commitments. (See [Gol01] for formal definitions.)
Adpative Concurrent Non-Malleable Zero-Knowledge
Our definition of adpative concurrent non-malleable zero-knowledge is very similar to that of concurrent non-malleable zero-knowledge from [BPS06] (which in turn closely follows the definition of simulation extractability of [PR05] ), with the only difference that now the adversary is allowed to adaptively select the statements it receives proofs to, subject to that they are true statements.
Let P, V be an interactive proof for a language L ∈ N P with witness relation R L , and let n be the security parameter. Consider a man-in-the-middle adversary A that participates in many left and right interactions in which m = m(n) proofs take place. In the left interactions, the adversary A verifies the validity of statements x 1 , . . . , x m by interacting with an honest prover P , using identities id 1 , . . . , id m . In the right interactions, A proves the validity of statementsx 1 , . . . ,x m to an honest verifier V , using identitiesĩd 1 , . . . ,ĩd m . Prior to the interactions, all parties in the system receives as common input the security parameter in unary 1 n , and A receives as auxiliary input z ∈ {0, 1} * . Furthermore, at the beginning of each left (respectively right) interaction, the adversary adaptively selects the statement x i (respectivelyx i ) and the identity id i (respectivelyĩd i ), with the only restriction that all the statements x 1 , . . . , x m chosen in the left interactions have to be true. Additionally in each left interaction, the prover P receives as local input a witness w i ∈ R L (x i ), chosen adaptively by a witness-selecting machine M . More specifically, M is a (randomized) Turing machine that runs in exponential time, and whenever the adversary chooses a statement x i for a left interaction, M on inputs the statement x i and the current view of all parties (including the adversary, provers, and receivers), picks a witness w i ∈ R L (x i ) as the private input of the prover P . Let view A,M (n, z) denote a random variable that describes the view of A in the above experiment. Loosely speaking, an interactive proof is adaptive concurrent non-malleable zeroknowledge (ACNMZK) if for all man-in-the-middle adversary A, there exists a probabilistic polynomial time machine (called the simulator-extractor) that can simulate both the left and the right interactions for A, while outputting a witness for every statement proved by the adversary in the right interactions.
Definition 1 An interactive proof (P, V ) for a language L with witness relation R L is said to be adaptive concurrent non-malleable zero-knowledge if for every polynomial m, and every probabilistic polynomial-time man-in-the-middle adversary A that participates in at most m = m(n) concurrent executions, there exists a probabilistic polynomial time machine S, such that, for every input-selecting machine M :
1. The following ensembles are computationally indistinguishable over n ∈ N -{view A,M (n, z)} n∈N,z∈{0,1} * -{S 1 (1 n , z)} n∈N,z∈{0,1} * where S 1 (1 n , z) denotes the first output of S(1 n , z).
Let z ∈ {0, 1}
* and (view, w) denote the output of S(1 n , z). Letx 1 , . . . ,x m be the statements of the right-interactions in view, and let id 1 , . . . , id m and id 1 , . . . ,ĩd m be the identities of the left-interactions and right-interactions in view. Then for every i ∈ [m], if the i th right-interaction is accepting and
We also consider concurrent ZK with adaptive input selection. We say that an interactive proof (P, V ) is adaptive concurrent ZK (ACZK) if it satisfies the above definition with respect to adversaries that only receive proofs (and do not give proofs).
Remark 1. As mentioned before, the security proof in [BPS06, LPTV10] can be extended to show that their constructions of CNMZK protocols satisfy a notion of CNMZK with weak adaptive input selection, where the adversary can only choose to hear proofs of statements for which a witness can be computed efficiently. Formally, the witness-selecting machine is restricted to be computationally bounded (i.e., a non-uniform PPT ) and only receives a statement as input (but not the views of the adversary, the left prover and right receiver 1 ).
Remark 2. Universal Composability [Can01] considers a more generalized form of adaptive input selection, where both the statements and witnesses are chosen adaptively by a separate entity called the "environment", which may communicate with the adversary in an arbitrarily way. In contrast, our definition of ACNMZK only allows the witnesses to be selected by a separate entity, whereas the statements are chosen directly by the adversary. Unfortunately, it has been shown that Universal Composable ZK is unachievable without set-up [CKL03] . Our construction can actually satisfy a slight strengthening of the above definition of ACNMZK, where the statements are adaptively chosen by a stateless non-uniform PPT machine-called the statement-selecting machine-that both the adversary and the simulator have oracle accesses to. This will bring us closer to the fully adaptive case of Universal Composability; we leave details to the full version.
Non-Malleable Commitment Schemes
We recall the definition of nonmalleability from [LPV08] (which builds upon the definition of [DDN00, PR05] ). Let C, R be a tag-based statistically binding commitment scheme, and let n ∈ N be a security parameter. Consider a man-in-the-middle adversary A that, on auxiliary inputs n and z, participates in one left and one right interaction simultaneously. In the left interaction, the man-in-the-middle adversary A interacts with C, receiving a commitment to value v, using identity id of its choice. In the right interaction A interacts with R attempting to commit to a related valueṽ, again using identityĩd of its choice. If the right commitment is invalid, or undefined, its value is set to ⊥. Furthermore, ifĩd = id,ṽ is also set to ⊥-i.e., a commitment where the adversary copies the identity of the left interaction is considered invalid. Let nmc A C,R (v, z) denote a random variable that describes the valueṽ and the view of A, in the above experiment.
Definition 2 A statistically binding commitment scheme C, R is said to be non-malleable (with respect to itself) if for every polynomial p(·), and every probabilistic polynomial-time man-in-the-middle adversary A, the following ensembles are computationally indistinguishable.
Non-Malleable Commitment Robust w.r.t. k-round Protocols The notion of non-malleability w.r.t. arbitrary k-round protocols is introduced in [LP09] . Unlike traditional definitions of non-malleability, which only consider man-in-the middle adversaries that participate in two (or more) executions of the same protocol, non-malleability w.r.t. arbitrary protocols considers a class of adversaries that can participate in a left interaction of any arbitrary protocol. Below we recall the definition. Consider a one-many man-in-the-middle adversary A that participates in one left interaction-communicating with a machine B-and one right interaction-acting as a commiter using the commitment scheme C, R . As in the standard definition of non-malleability, A can adaptively choose the identity in the right interaction. We denote by nmc
where B(y),Ã(z) (1 n ) denotes the view ofÃ in interaction with B on common input 1 n , and private inputs z and y respectively, then it holds that: We say that C, R is non-malleable w.r.t. k-round protocols if C, R is nonmalleable w.r.t. any PPT machine B that interacts with the man-in-the-middle adversary in k rounds. Below, we focus on commitment schemes that are nonmalleable w.r.t. itself and arbitrary (n)-round protocols, where is a superlogarithmic function. We say that such a commitment scheme is robust w.r.t.
(n)-round protocols. It has been shown in [LPV08] In this section we construct an adaptive concurrent non-malleable zero-knowledge proof based on collision-resistant hash-functions. The construction is almost identical to the CNMZK proof system in [LPTV10] , except that, the verifier is asked to provide more CECom commitments to its trapdoor at the beginning of the protocol, which, in the proof, facilitates the simulator-extractor to extract the trapdoor while strategically avoiding rewinding certain messages. Let (n) be any super logarithmic function. Our adaptive concurrent nonmalleable zero-knowledge protocol, ACNMZKProof, employs several commitment protocols. Let Com sh be a 2-round statistically hiding commitment (based on collision-resistant hash-functions), Com sb be a 2-round statistically binding commitment (based on one-way functions), and NMCom be an O( (n))-round statistically binding commitment scheme that is robust w.r.t. (n)-round protocols (based on one-way functions).
Our protocol also employs (n)-round statistically hiding (respectively statistically binding) concurrently-extractable commitment schemes, CECom sh (respectively CECom sb ). These schemes are essentially instantiations of the PRS preamble [PRS02] , and can be constructed given Com sh and Com sb . Below we repeat their definitions.
To commit a n-bit string v, the commiter chooses n × (n) pairs of random n-bit strings (α
i,j = v for every i and j. The sender then commits to v and each of the 2n (n) strings in parallel using Com sh . This is followed by (n) rounds of interactions. In the j th interaction, the receiver sends a random n-bit challenge b j = b 1,j . . . b n,j , and the commiter decommits the commitments of α A (n)-round statistically binding concurrently-extractable commitment scheme, CECom sh , is defined analogously as CECom sh with the initial commitment Com sh replaced by Com sb . Additionally, we say a transcript of CECom sh is valid if there exists a valid decommitment.
We now describe ACNMZKProof, our adaptive concurrent non-malleable zeroknowledge protocol. Protocol ACNMZKProof for a language L ∈ N P proceeds in six stages given a security parameter n, a common input statement x ∈ {0, 1} n , an identity id, and a private input w ∈ R L (x) to the Prover.
Stage 1: The Verifier chooses a random string r ∈ {0, 1} n and commits to r using k(n) + 1 invocations of CECom sh , where k(n) is the number of rounds in Stage 2-6 of the protocol; r is called the "fake witness". Stage 2: The Prover commits to the witness w using CECom sb . Stage 3: The Prover commits to the witness w using NMCom with identity id. Stage 4: The Prover commits to the witness w using NMCom with identity id, again. Stage 5: The Verifier decommits the Stage 1 commitment to value r .
Stage 6: The Prover using a ω(1)-round ZK proof (e.g., [Blu86] ), proves that the commitments in Stages 2, 3 and 4 all commit to the same valuew (with identity id), and that eitherw ∈ R L (x) orw = r .
A formal description of the protocol can be found in Figure 1 .
On Round Complexity: Since the protocol NMCom has O( (n)) rounds, we have that k(n) = O( (n)). Therefore, the round complexity of the protocol ACNMZKProof is O( 2 (n)) = ω(log 2 n). The above protocol is an extension of the Goldreich-Kahan protocol [GK96] . Completeness and Soundness follows using stand techniques; since the protocol is essentially the same as the CNMZK protocol in [LPTV10] (except that Stage 1 now contains many CECom's), we refer the reader to [LPTV10] for more details.
Protocol ACNMZKProof
Common Input: an instance x of a language L with witness relation RL, an identifier id, and a security parameter n. Auxiliary Input for Prover: a witness w, such that (x, w) ∈ RL(x).
Stage 1:
V uniformly chooses r ∈ {0, 1} n (the "fake witness").
V commits to r using k + 1 invocations of the protocol CECom sh , where k is the number of rounds in Stage 2-6 of the protocol. Let T1 be the commitment transcript.
Stage 2:
P commits to w using protocol CECom sb . Let T2 be the commitment transcript.
Stage 3:
P commits to w using protocol NMCom and identity id. Let T3 be the commitment transcript.
Stage 4:
P commits to w using protocol NMCom and identity id. Let T4 be the commitment transcript.
Stage 5:
V decommits T1 to value r; P aborts if no valid decommitment is given. Stage 6: P ↔ V: a ω(1)-round ZK proof [Blu86] of the statement: There existsw such that -w is a valid decommitment of T2, -andw is a valid decommitment of T3 and T4 under identity id, -andw ∈ RL(x) orw = r. 
Proof of Security
The definition of ACNMZK requires a simulator-extractor S that is able to simulate the view of a man-in-the-middle adversary A (including both left and right interactions), while simultaneously extracting the witnesses to statements proved in the right interactions. We describe the construction of our simulator in Section 4.1, show that it is a correct ACZK simulator in Section 4.2, and extend this proof to show the ACNMZK property in Section 5.
Our Simulator-Extractor
Our simulator-extractor, S, is almost identical to the simulator extractor of the CNMZK protocol in [LPTV10] , except that now, given more CECom sh 's in Stage 1 of the protocol, S tries to extract a "fake" witness from every CECom sh from the adversary in the left interactions, and aborts if the extraction fails for any of the commitment or the extracted value does not equal to the value that the adversary decommitment to later. Roughly speaking, S follows this strategy:
Simulating the view of the right interactions. S simply follows the honest verifier strategy. Simulating the view of the left interactions. In each protocol execution, S first extracts the "fake witness" r from the k(n) + 1 CECom sh 's committed by A in Stage 1, then commits to r in Stage 2, 3, and 4, and finally simulates the ZK proof using r as a witness in Stage 6. Extracting the witnesses. In each right interaction that completes successfully, S extracts a witness w from CECom sb committed by A in Stage 2 of the protocol.
Thus, the main task of S is to extract the values committed by A, using CECom, in Stage 1 and 2 of the protocol. This is done by rewinding A during each CECom. To that end, we employ the "lazy KP" simulator of [PTV08] , an oblivious simulator that is nearly identical to the Killian-Petrank (KP) simulator [KP01] .
We also follow the analysis of [PTV08] , which is in turn based on the analysis of [PRS02] . On a very high-level, S attempts to simulate the view of A (with "fake witnesses") in one continuous, straight-line manner (so as to not skew the output distribution); this is aided by numerous auxiliary rewinds that allows S to extract the "fake witnesses" in time. As implied by our simulation strategy, the view of A generated by S depends on the extracted "fake witnesses", but is otherwise independent of the interaction in auxiliary rewinds. (The simulator S is essentially identical to the simualtor of the CNMZK protocol in [LPTV10] ; we refer the reader to [LPTV10] for a more detailed description.)
It is useful to know that S may abort in two manners. At the end of a CECom, if S is unable to extract the committed value (the rewinds were unhelpful), S outputs ⊥ ext . Or, in Stage 5 of a left interaction, if A decommits its Stage 1 CECom sh 's to a value that is different from any of the k(n) + 1 extracted values, S outputs ⊥ bind . Conversely if S does not abort, then it must have extracted the committed value from every Stage 1 CECom sh that it has encountered, and A must decommit to the extracted values (if A decommits at all). The following claim bounds the abort probability of S.
Claim 2 S outputs ⊥ ext and ⊥ bind with negligible probability.
The proof is identical to the proof of Claim 2 in [LPTV10] , which in turn follow directly from the analysis of [PTV08] in the setting of concurrent ZK; we refer the reader to [LPTV10] for a formal proof.
Proof of ACZK
We first show that S is a valid ACZK simulator for the protocol ACNMZKProof, that is, the view generated by S is indistinguishable from the real view of A.
Lemma 3 For every witness-selecting machine M , the following ensembles are computationally indistinguishable over n ∈ N:
To show Lemma 3, we introduce a series of hybrid simulators; the same hybrid simulators will also be helpful later in showing the ACNMZK property in Section 5. Hybrids hyb i , 0 ≤ i ≤ m + 1 proceed in three steps.
Real Excution Phase:
Run the honest man-in-the-middle execution with A until the i th left interaction starts: in left iteration j < i, run the witnessselecting machine M (on input the statement x j of this interaction, and the current view of the adversary, prover and verifier) to compute a valid witnesses w j and execute the honest prover strategy. Note that the Real Exeuciton Phase may take exponential time. Let V A be the view of A, and V P , V V the view of the prover and verifier produced in this phase. Simulation Phase: Feed A with V A . Run the following simulation strategy with A to complete the partial execution defined by (V A , V P , V V ).
-For every right interaction, emulate the interaction by following the honest verifier strategy from V V . -For left interaction j < i, emulate the interaction by following the honest prover strategy from V P . -For left interaction j ≥ i, simulate the interaction using a "fake" witness, as S does. Formally, this simulation strategy can be implemented as follows: construct another machine A that internally incorporates A and simulates the first i − 1 left and all right interactions for A honestly from V P and V V , and forwards the rest m − i + 1 left interactions externally. Then simply run S on A and outputs the embedded view of A in the view of A produced by S. Output Phase: Output ⊥ ext or ⊥ bind if S returns ⊥ ext or ⊥ bind ; otherwise, output the view V of A embeded in the view of A produced by S.
We also define hybrids hyb i + that proceed identically to hyb i except that, in the Simulation Phase, the i th left interaction is simulated using a real witness (rather than the "fake" witness). This can be done as the Real Execution Phase runs till the i th left interaction starts, and can also compute the real witness of the i th interaction. Note that these hybrids hyb i , hyb However, these rewinds do not extract any new "fake witnesses" for use in the output view, and do not skew the output distribution because the rewinding schedule (including which rewind determines the output view) is oblivious. Since both machines abort at most with negligible probability by Claim 4, their outputs are statistically close.
Lemma 6 The outputs of hyb i and hyb i + are computationally indistinguishable. Proof. Assume for contradiction that there exists an adversary A and a polynomial p, such that, for infinitely many n ∈ N , hyb i and hyb i + are distinguishable with probability 1/p(n). Towards reaching a contradiction, note that hyb i and hyb i + differ only in how the i th left interaction is simulated (fake or real witness) in the rewindings. We thus want to violate the computational hiding property of Stage 2-4 of the protocol, or the strongly witness-indistinguishable property (implied by the ZK property) of Stage 6. However, two problems arise: (1) the Real Execution Phase of the two hybrids takes exponential steps, and (2) Stage 2-6 of the i th left interaction maybe rewound by the simualtor S. Fix a n ∈ N for which our hypothesis holds. To overcome the first problem, by our hypothesis, there must exist an execution of the Real Execution Phase-defined by the views of the adversary V A , the left prover V P and the right verifier V V produced in this phase-such that, conditioned on (V A , V P , V V ) occurring in the two hybrids, hyb i and hyb i + are still distinguishable with probability 1/p(n). Given (V A , V P , V V ), the rest of the hybrids (i.e., the Simulation Phase and Output Phase) can be generated efficiently.
Now it only remains to handle the second problem, that is, Stage 2-6 of the i th left interaction may be rewound in the Simulation Phase. We consider another two hybridsh yb i andh yb i + , which proceed identically to hyb i and hyb i + respectively, except that, in the Simulation Phase, they employ the following alternative simulation strategy that avoids rewinding Stage 2-6 of the i th left interactions.
The alternative simulation strategy ofh yb i : The goal this simulation strategy is to complete the partial execution (V A , V P , V V ) produced by the Real Execution Phase, without rewinding Stage 2-6 of the i th left interaction. Let {m 1 , . . . , m t } for t = k(n)/2, be the messages that A sends in Stage 2-6 of the i th left interaction; and a i the reply to m i from the left prover. Then the execution of A continuing from V A is "equivalent" to the sequential execution of the following t + 1 machinesÃ 1 , . . . ,Ã t+1 .
Machine A i on input a partial view V i−1 of A up until the message m i−1 is sent and the reply a i−1 (V 0 = V A and a 0 = ε), continue the execution of A from V i−1 , by feeding V i−1 and a i−1 to A, and forwarding every message from A externally; finally, it aborts when A terminates or sends the message m i , and output the newly generated view V i of A.
The alternative simulation strategy, instead of producing a simulated view of A "in one shot", produces the view "progressively" by simulating the view of A 1 , . . . , A t+1 in sequence. Furthermore, the simulation strategy remembers all the "fake witnesses" it has extracted so far, and to simulate the view of A i , it can use the "fake" witnesses extracted when simulating the views of A j 's with j < i. More precisely, let S (initialized to empty set) denote the set of "fake witnesses" extracted so far; let (V , and simulate the rest m − i + 1 left interactions using "fake" witnesses-except that now the "fake" witnesses can be obtained through extracting from some CECom sh 's in this step, or in previous steps, found in S. (Output ⊥ ext if no such fake witness is available, and ⊥ bind , if A i decommits to a value different from any of the "fake" witnesses extracted.) 2. Set V j A to the view of A embedded in the simulated view of A i (set V j P and V j V appropriately as well); add all the "fake" witnesses extracted in this step to S.
Finally,h yb
We remark that in step j, the only message that A j receives belonging to Stage 2-6 of the i th left is a j−1 . This is because A in A j starts its execution from V j−1 A , after messages m 1 to m j−1 are sent, and is cutoff immediately after m j is sent. Therefore, during the simulation with A i , in every rewinding, A never sends m 1 to m j−1 again, and never receives a reply to m j (as every time it does send m j , it is cutoff immediately). Hence the only message it receive is a j−1 . Therefore, overall, the alternative simulation strategy never rewinds Stage 2-6 of the i th left interaction.
The alternative simulation strategy ofh yb On the other hand,h yb i (respectivelyh yb i + ) outputs ⊥ ext only if it fails to extract a "fake" witness for some left interaction j ≥ i (respectively j > i). Fix one such j, since left interaction j starts completely after V A (the view generated in the Real Execution Phase), the execution of this interaction occurs completely inside machines A 1 , . . . , A t+1 , where t = k/2. Then since the number of CECom sh 's in Stage 1 of the left interaction is k + 1 > t + 1, there exists a machine A j , such that, during its execution, a complete CECom sh from A is sent. Then in Step j ofh yb i (respectivelyh yb i + ), the alternative simulation strategy must try to extract a "fake" witness from this CECom sh , and by Claim 4, it succeeds except with negligible probability. Therefore, by union bound, the probability thath yb + are distinguishable with probability at least 1/2p(n). Note that continuing from (V A , V P , V V ) the rest of the two hybrids can be efficiently generated, and the only difference between the two hybrids lies in how Stage 2-6 of the i th left interaction are simulated (using a fake or a real witness), which are never rewound in the two hybrids. Then it follows directly from the computational hiding property of Stage 2-4, and the strongly witness-indistinguishable property (implied by the ZK property) of Stage 6 that conditioned on (V A , V P , V V ),h yb Remark 3. Note that Claim 4 is crucial to the analysis of the hybrids. The analysis of [PRS02, MOSV06] can only realize Claim 4 for committed-verifier protocols. Since ACNMZKProof is not committed-verifier, we instead turn to the analysis of [PTV08] . Alternatively, it seems we can also utilize the analysis of [KP01] , at the cost of O(log 2 n) round complexity.
Proof of ACNMZK
As shown in the last section, the simulator constructed in Section 4.1 is a correct ACZK simulator, that is, the first output of S (i.e., view = S 1 (1 n , z)) is computationally indistinguishable from the real view of the adversary. To further show that S is also a correct ACNMZK simulator-extractor, it remains to show that the second output of S contains the valid N P witnesses of the statements proved in the right interactions (in view).
By construction, the witnesses that S outputs are just values it extracts out from the CECom sb 's in Stage 2 of the right interactions. Therefore, if A always commits to valid witnesses using CECom sb in the right interactions, by Claim 2 the simulator S would extract the valid witnesses except with negligible probability. Therefore, the following lemma establishes the correctness of the output witnesses:
Lemma 9 For every PPT adversary A, there exists a negligible function ν, such that for every n ∈ N and z ∈ {0, 1} * , the probability that A fails to commit to a valid witness in Stage 2 of a right interaction that is accepting and uses a different identity from all left interactions in view = S 1 (1 n , z), is less than ν(n).
Proof. Assume for contradiction that there exists a man-in-the-middle adversary A that participates in m = m(n) left and right interactions, and a polynomial function p, such that for infinitely many n ∈ N and z ∈ {0, 1} * , A cheats in an outcome of S 1 (1 n , z) with probability 1/p(n); by cheating, we mean that A fails to commit to a valid witness in Stage 2 of any right interaction that is accepting and uses a different identity from all the left interactions. (Note that A is not considered cheating if the simulator fails to output a view of A).
Consider again the series of hybrids, hyb i and hyb i + , defined in section 4.2. Since the output of hyb 1 is statistically close to the output of S, by our hypothesis, the probability that A cheats in hyb 1 is non-negligible. On the other hand, in hyb m+1 , it follows from the soundness of Stage 6 that, except with negligible probability, in every accepting right interaction, A commits to either a real or a "fake" witness; it further follows from the statistically hiding property of Stage 1 and the (stand-alone) extractability of Stage 2 that, except with negligible probability, A never commits to a "fake" witness in any accepting right interactions. Hence, by union bound, except with negligible probability, A never cheats in hyb m+1 . It follows from Claim 6 that the probabilities of A cheating in hyb i + and hyb i+1 differ by at most a negligible amount. Therefore, for infinitely many n, there must exist an i = i(n), such that, the probabilities of A cheating in hyb i and hyb i + differ by at least a polynomial amount. Since the total number of right interactions is bounded by a polynomial, this implies that the probabilities that A cheats in a randomly chosen right interaction in the two hybrids differ by a polynomial amount.
Notice that the hybrids hyb i and hyb i + proceed identically up until the i th left interaction starts. After that, the only difference between the two experiments lies in how the i th left interaction is simulated (using either the fake or real witnesses). Towards reaching a contradiction, we want to claim that, by the non-malleability and (n)-robustness of NMCom, the value A commits to in a randomly chosen right interaction is "computationally independent" from how Stage 2-6 of the i th left interaction are simulated. However, (as in proof of Lemma 5) two problems arise: one is that the Real Execution Phase of the two hybrids can not be generated efficiently, and the other is that both Stage 2-6 of the i th left and the randomly chosen right interactions might be rewound by S. We solve the two problem in the same way as in proof of Lemma 5: to overcome the first problem, we fix one execution of the Real Execution Phase (V A , V P , V V ) such that conditioned on it occurring, the two hybrids are still distinguishable with high probability; to overcome the second problem, we again consider two alternative hybridsĥ yb Therefore by our hypothesis, the probabilities that A cheats in a randomly chosen right interaction inĥ yb i andĥ yb i + differ by a polynomial amount. However, the only difference between the two hybrids lies in how Stage 2-6 of the i th left interaction are simulated (using a fake or a real witness), AND the Stage 2-6 of the i th left and the randomly chosen right interactions are never rewound in the two hybrids. Then it follows using the same proof of Lemma 7 in [LPTV10] that, essentially by the non-malleability and (n)-robustness of NMCom that the probability that A commits to a "fake" witness in Stage 2 of the randomly chosen right interaction differ by at most a negligible amount, which gives a contradiction.
